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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
A. C. KARTCHNER and
IRENE B. KARTCHNER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
LYMAN MERRILL HORNE, FREDERICK C. SORENSEN, and CLICQUOT CLUB BOTTLING COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY,
UTAH, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
7911

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake
City is a corporation incorporated in the State of Utah
February 3, 1947, with an authorized capital stock of
200,000 shares of common stock and 100,000 shares
of preferred stock, all of no par value ( 80) . * No
*The figures enclosed in parentheses like this one refer to the page
in the Record on Appeal supporting the statement.
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change has ever been made in the authorized capital. At the time of its organization, the capital stock
both common and preferred, was fully subscribed
and all of the shares subscribed were thereafter issued
on March 1, 1947, to the subscribers (Exhibit "M").
During the course of this suit the stock issued was
generally referred to as the Stanis stock, the Winder
stock, the Horne stock, and the Sorensen stock. The
stock with which we are concerned is the common
stock only, and all references hereafter are to common stock.
Prior to November 1, 1949, Mrs. Stanis owned
10,000 shares, the Winders owned 48,000 shares, the
Homes owned 41,000 shares, and Sorensen owned
101,000 shares. On November 1, 1949, the defendants
Lyman Merril Horne and Frederick C. Sorensen
signed, sealed with the corporate seal and issued to
Alton B. Kartchner and Irene B. Kartchner, the plaintiffs, as joint tenants, a certificate for 100,000 shares
of said common stock.
Upon the incorporation of the defendant corporation, the defendant Horne was elected President and
Director and the defendant Sorensen was elected a
Director and was employed as the Manager. Sorensen
continued to be the Manager and a Director up to
and including the time of the issuing of the certificate for 100,000 shares on November 1, 1949, which
certificate shall hereinafter be called the Kartchner
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certificate. The defendant Horne continued to be
President and a Director until either October 31,
1949, or November 1, 1949, depending upon the legal
effect of his conduct.
On October 31, 1949, Horne wrote, signed and
mailed the following letters, and enclosed with them
all of the stock certificate belonging to him and to
Mrs. Horne, covering a total of 41,000 .shares ( 108,
189), which certificates had been endorsed in blank
because Horne did not then know the names of the
persons to whom the stock was to be transferred
( 189):
Exhibit "C"

LYMAN MERRILL HORNE, M. D.
Physician and Surgeon
220 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE

Salt Lake City, Utah

October 31, 1949
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of
Salt Lake City
15 South 2nd East
City
Dear Sirs:
Please find enclosed with this letter all the
stock certificates in my name, Lyman M.
Horne, M.D., and those in the name of Myrtle
S. Horne. I am returning them to you as of
the above date. I do hereby, relinquish my
interest in the Clicquot Club Bottling Company
of Salt Lake City.
Very sincerely,
(sgd) Lyman M. Horne, M.D.
Lyman M. Horne, M.D.
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Exhibit "0"

LYMAN MERRILL HORNE, M. D.
Physician and Surgeon

220 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
Salt Lake City, Utah

October 31, 1949
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of
Salt Lake City
15 South 2nd E.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Sirs:
I, hereby, resign as president of the company
and director of the company ( Clicquot Club
Bottling Company of Salt Lake City).
This is because I cannot further support the
company financially and because my health
will not permit me to carry this responsibility.
Sincerely,
(sgd) Lyman M. Horne, M.D.
Lyman M. Horne, M.D.
Neither the letters nor the enclosed certificates
had been received at the corporation offices at the
time the Kartchner certificate was signed on November 1, 1949 ( 196).
On November 1, 1949, at the time the Kartchner
certificate was issued, the Stanis stock, 10,000 shares,
was outstanding ( 115, 198, 216, and Finding No. 16),
the Winder stock, 48,000 shares, was outstanding
( 115, 116, 196 and Finding No. 16), the Horne stock,
41,000 shares, was in the mail as stated above and
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the Sorensen stock, 101,000 shares, was or was not
outstanding, depending upon the effect of the following facts:
On March 1 , 1947, when Certificate No. 8, for
101,000 shares was issued to Sorensen, that certificate
was placed with the Horne certificate and was kept
by Dr. Horne. in his medical office ( 194, 195), which
is in the same building as the office and plant of the
defendant corporation. It was kept by him until
October 31, 1949, when it was enclosed, unendorsed
( 116, 17 7, 180, 202-204), in the envelope with the
letters of resignation and Horne stock and mailed to
Sorensen at the corporation office. It had not been
received by Sorensen or the corporation at the time
the Kartchner certificate was issued ( 196).
Prior to the time of the issuing of the Kartchner
certificate Sorensen had intended to obtain the surrender of the Stanis, Horne and Winder stock, to combine this with 1,000 shares of his own stock and sell
it to the Kartchners, thus achieving a situation where
he owned one-half the corporation and the Kartchners owned one-half of the corporation. However, he
had not actually done this prior to the issuance of the
Kartchner certificate on November 1, 1949. Sorensen
knew that the Winders had not surrendered their
stock by November 1, 1949, and first discovered that
they would not surrender their stock when he met
with Homer Winder some time after November 17,
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1949 ( 232). He knew that the Stanis stock had not
been surrended on November 1, 1949 (198, 207, 220),
and he contemplated making a trip to California
thereafter to obtain the transfer of the Stanis stock
( 216) . He had made no transfer of his own stock but
contemplated doing so in the future ( 197). Up until
the meeting was held with Horner vVinder on or after
November 17, 1949, Sorensen didn't know how much
of his stock he might be required to surrender to
effectuate his plans (208, 209, 220).
In the summer of 1949, the plaintiffs had purchased a distributorship in Provo for Clicquot Club
products and the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner was operating that distributorship ( 118). In August, 1949, the
defendant Sorensen commenced to negotiate with
the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner relative to the sale of
an interest in the defendant corporation ( 121). The
defendant Horne knew there were negotiations for
this sale in progress, but did not know with whom
the negotiations were being carried on,. He did not
personally contact either of the plaintiffs prior to
November 1, 1949, nor did he, prior to that time,
make any representations to them. There is a direct
conflict in the evidence as to whether the defendant
Sorensen misrepresented the nt worth and arning
ability of the corporation and the court below resolved that conflict in his favor. At any rate, it was
agreed that a one-half interest in the corporation
could be purchased for $12,000.00 and the Provo
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distributorship, which was given an agreed value of
$6,000.00 ( 109, 212). Payment was to be made to
the corporation and the stock issued by the corporation.
On September 23, 1949, A. C. Kartchner gave
Sorensen a check payable to the defendant Clicquot
Club Bottling Company drawn on the joint funds of
him and plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner for $1,000,00
as earnest money ( 135). Both of. the plaintiffs and
the defendant Sorensen and his wife were present at
that time ( 122). On October 11, 1949, the plaintiffs
paid $250.00, on October 13, 1949, $500.00, and on
November 1, 1949, an additional $500.00. Thereafter, on November 1, 1949, the plaintiffs went again
to the company's office in Salt Lake City were the
certificate for 100,000 shares (Exhibit "B") was issued and the distributorship transferred to the company. Thereafter the plaintiffs paid an additional
$9,796.53, making a total payment of $18,046.53 in
money and property ( 136 and Exhibit "L") . One-half
the money and property paid for the said stock was
the property of the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner ( 185)
and one-half was the property of the plaintiff A. C.
Kartchner (134, 135, 136).
The plaintiff, Irene B. Kartchner, was present at
some of the conversations preliminary to the stock
purchase, though there is no evidence as to which
conversations, or what was said. She was at the
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meeting where the down payment of $1,000.00 was
made, and was present when the November 1, 1949,
payment was made, the distributorship transferred
and the Kartchner certificate issued to her and Mr.
Kartchner by the defendants Horne and Sorensen
acting as the President and a Director, respectively,
of the defendant corporation ( 184, 185). She believed the certificate to be valid and to represent
100,00 shares of the capital stock of the defendant
corporation ( 185). Had she believed otherwise, she
would not hav~ paid for it ( 185). Further, there was
nothing in the circumstances surrounding the transaction that indicated to her that the certificate might
not be valid ( 185). Some of the time she leaves business matters to her husband, and she left most of
this one to him ( 185), but participated personally in
at least the instances hereinabove noted. There is
no evidence of what she left to her husband and what
she did not.
The plaintiff Alton C. Kartchner discussed the
stock purchase with the defendant Sorensen many
times. He knew there was stock outstanding before
November 1, 1949 ( 148), but was told by Sorensen
that it would all be in and signed over by November
1, 1949 ( 148). At the time of the issuance of the
Kartchner certificates, he asked Sorensen if the stock
was all good and Sorensen replied that it was ( 148).
When he received the stock certificate for 100,000
shares, he believed it represented half the business of
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The follou•ing paragraph should be inserted betzrecn the second and third paragraphs on page 9 of
the brief:
The plaintiffs contended ( 1) that the Kartchner
certificate \Yas void as an over-issue, and was not
genuine· for the reason that Dr. Horne had resigned
as President of the corporation prior to the time he
~igned the certificate as President, (2) that the defendants Horne and Sorensen represented to the plaintiffs that the certificate was valid and genuine and
passed them title to 100,000 shares of the stock of
the defendant corporation, but that said representations were false, ( 3) that the defendants Horne and
Sorensen are the persons who issued the certificate
as valid, in violation of their fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs, and their doing so constituted fraud and
deceit as a matter of law, (4) that the plaintiffs and
each of them \Vere entitled to rely a:qd did rely on
the representations of the defendants, and that the
plaintiffs were damaged thereby in the amount of
$18,046.53, one-half of which had been paid from
the separate property of each plaintiff, and ( 5) that
the defendants Horne and Sorensen, as well as the
corporation, were liable to them for the full amount
of their damages.
The court found for the defendants, and made
and entered its judgment of no cause of action. The
plaintiffs appeal taking the position that the testiInony of the defendants themselves, together with
that portion of the evidence of the plaintiffs on which
there is no conflict in the record, require findings
of fact and conclusions of law supporting a judgment
in favor of each of them and against all the defendants and ask that the trial court be reversed and
judgn1ent be entered accordingly.
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the Clicquot Club Bottling Company, and would not
have paid for the stock had he believed otherwise
- - .:;:Ats;;~tr'

(134).

After the stock purchase, the company continued
to operate under the direction of the plaintiff A. C.
Kartchner and the defendant Sorensen until June 6,
1950, \Yhen it went into receivership (81). No part
of the $18,046.53 paid has ever been repaid to the
plaintiffs ( 139).
The court found for the defendants and made
and entered its judgment of "no cause of action" as
to all the defendants.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I

There is insufficient evidence in the record to
support certain of the Findings of Fact made by
the trial court.
II

The trial court failed to make certain Findings
of Facts which the uncontroverted evidence requires.
III

Officers and directors occupy a fiduciary relation to persons to whom they sell stock in the corporation of which they are officers.
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IV
It is the duty of officers and directors to know
that material statements in stock certificates and the
representations implicit in their signing and issuing
those certificates are true.

v
Such officers and directors are personally liable
to persons who relied upon the truth of those representations which are proved to have been false when
made.

VI
Scienter or knowledge on the part of one making
a material representation which is in fact false is
not necessary to liability for damages arising therefrom where there is a duty on the part of such person
to know the facts and his lack of knowledge is due
to a neglect of duty.

VII
One who represents a thing to be true without
knowing it to be true is liable in deceit if it is in
fact false.

VIII
Neither ratification nor estoppel can render the
Kartchner certificate valid or give the plaintiffs any
rights under it.
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ARGUMENT

Before we can usefully discuss the points of law
involved in this case it is necessary to determine
what facts are established by the record. The findings of facts entered below do not give us this information because much was found which was not
supported by the evidence and much was not found
which the record clearly established. Hence this
argument will deal first with the facts, then with
the law.
In this regard
-r,)it should be pointed out that no
objection is made ai thosefindings which are material
and are supported by the record and there is no
discussion of those findings which are immaterial,
whether supported by the record or not.
Point I

There is Insufficient Evidence in the Record to
Support the Following Findings of Fact Made by the
Trial Court:
A.

Finding No. 1.2 wherein it states:

"That defendant Horne was not a party
to, nor did he have anything whatsoever to
do with, the negotiation or agreement finally
reached between the Clicquot Club Bottling
Company, defendant Sorensen and plaintiffs,
nor were any representations made by defendant Horne to plaintiffs directly or through
any third party."
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The evidence relative to this point is that the
defendant Horne never talked with either of the
plaintiffs prior to November 1, 1949. This fact is
not in dispute. However, during all of the period
of the negotiation for the sale of this stock the defendant Horne was the President and a Director of the
corporation whose stock was to be sold, and had
made arrangements with Sorensen to find a buyer
for the stock ( 187, 188). He says:
"I made arrangement with Mr. Sorensen,
if he found a buyer who was a business man
and would come in and take hold of this company, come in and ··make· a success of it, I
would give him all my stock, and Mrs. Horne
would give him all her stock, and I would, in
addition to that, cancel all the obligations of
the company to me."
This is verified by the defendant Sorensen who
testified as follows ( 210) :

"* * * The stockholders, Dr. Horne, Mrs.
Horne, the Winders had told me they didn't
want to support the company at all any more,
and they would surrender their stock and for
me to find a buyer that was competent to go
into the business."
In fact, Dr. Horne signed the certificate for
100,000 shares of stock as President of the defendant
corporation knowing it was to go to the Kartchners
as purchasers and intending them to rely on its
validity (112, 113, 114):
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Q (by Mr. Tanner). "'I show you Dr.
Horne, \Yhat is marked Exhibit "B," which
purports to be 100,000 shares of capital stock
of the Clicquot Club Bottling Company, and
ask you to examine the signature in the space
reserved for the signature of the president,
and ask you if you will tell us if that is your
signature?
A. "Yes sir."
* * * * *

Q (by Mr. Tanner). "During the time
you were-strike that. It was necessary for
the issue of a valid stock certificate in this corporation that it bear the signature of both the
president and secretary-treasurer, was it not,
Mr. Home?
A. "I don't know, you tell me.
Q. "Was that your understanding?

A. "Yes sir.
Q. "You believed that to be the case?

A. "Well, those names are on certificates,
and Frederick brought that to me and asked
if I would sign it, Mr. Kartchner wanted that
certificate right now before he went away, so
I signed it.
Q. "Answer 'yes' or 'no' then it will save
the court's time. At the time you signed the
certificate you know the certificate was for
100,000 shares of stock?

A. "Yes.
Q. "You knew it was a certificate to be
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purchased by Irene and A. C. Kartchner did
you not?
A. "Yes, that is correct.
Q. "At that time -

A. "I don't know about Irene; let me look
at that?
Q. "By Mr. and Mrs. Kartchner, let's
put it that way?

A. "All right.
Q. "Is that true?

A. "Yes.
Q. "At that time did you know that they
were to pay for that certificate?

A. "Well I had made no arrangements
about payments, Mr. Sorensen was taking care
of that.
Q. "Well, at the time that that was
signed by you, or prior to that time Mr. Sorensen had told you he was selling 100,000
shares to Mr. Kartchner, had he not?"

** * * *
A. "He had not prior to that time.

Q (by Mr. Tanner). "At the time he
tendered it to you, did he tell you that?
A. "At the time he tendered it to me,
he said Mr. Kartchner was going to buy half
of the company.
Q. "Did he say how much he was going
to pay for it?

A. "No sir.
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Q. ""You understood he "vas going to pay
something for it, did you not?

A. "Yes sir.
Q. "'Vhen you signed that certificate you
intended the Kartchners to rely on its validity
and genuineness, did you not, Dr. Horne?"

* * * * *
A. "When I sign an instrume.nt, yes, it
is supposed to be genuine and it was genuine."
That certificate was thereupon affixed with the
corporate seal and issued to the plaintiffs.
It cannot be said that Dr. Horne made no representations to the plaintiffs. By the act of signing
this stock certificate as President for issue to the
plaintiffs he at least represented to them that it was
a valid certificate and that he was the President of
the corporation. Plaintiffs claim he made other representations by these acts which will be discussed
later, but even the most narrow construction of his
acts shows that he did make the above representations
to the plaintiffs.
It is not necessary to speak to a person to make
representations to him. Representations often take
the form of acts and sometimes of silence, and a representation is no less a representation because it is
made on a stock certificate which is then carried by
another to the person or persons to whom the certificate is issued.
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It cannot be said that the defendant Horne had
nothing to do with the negotiation or agreement to
purchase, for according to the defendant's own testimony, he was the President of the company of which
Sorensen was Manager, and had expressly authorized Sorensen to find a buyer. It cannot be said
that he made no representations to the plaintiffs
because by his own testimony he establishes that he
signed a stock certificate for issue to them and for
them to rely on.
B. Finding No. 13 wherein it states:
"The defendant Horne and defendant
Sorensen transmitted their stock certificates
to the office of the corporation endorsed in
blank."
This is true as to Horne, but not as to Sorensen.
According to the testimony of the defendant
Horne he put his and his wife's certificates in a letter
on October 31, 1949, endorsed in blank, addressed to
the corporation ( 189) :

Q (by Mr. Mulliner). "Did you hold
those shares in the spring and summer of 1949?
A. (by Dr. Horne). "Yes sir.
Q. What disposition did you make, if any,
·of these shares at that time?

A. "On October 31st, 1949, I mailed them
to the Clicquot Club Bottling Company signed
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-they were to go to Mr. Kartchner, but at
that time I didn't know his name, it was just
someone Mr. Sorensen was selling half of the
company to, and I didn't know his name, so I
just sent them blank, and sent them to the
company~ and they could \\Tite his name in
when they got there.''
Further, he enclosed Sorensen's certificate with
them and sent it downstairs to the corporation office
(116,117):

Q (by Mr. Tanner). "Then, Frederick
Sorensen hadn't turned back his 101,000 shares
by November 1st, 1949, had he?
A. (by Dr. Horne). You will have to ask
Frederick. I can tell I held Frederick's stock
in my drawer from the time the company
started until I turned the stock back; when I
turned my stock back I sent his stock downstairs-what he did after that-it went back
in the company, sir.
Q. Doctor, on Novembr 1st, 1949, Frederick Sorensen had not signed his certificate,
had he? Before you answer that you are perfectly free to read page 33 of your deposition.

A. "I don't believe he had; there had
been a lot of talk about it, actually I don't
think I had the certificate. I don't know.
Q. "In the deposition you said he had not
signed it?
A. "That is from hearsay, sir, there was
a lot of talk about it.
Q. "Did you believe it hadn't been
signed?
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A. "I believed it hadn't been signed, but
the certificate was in the box of the Clicquot
Club Bottling Company, so if he hadn't signed
it, it was the company's own fault.
Q. "At any rate it was not endorsed by
Novernber 1st, 1949, is that not true

A. "Well, if it wasn't it was their own
fault."
In view of the fact that Sorensen's endorsement
of his certificate for 101,000 shares was witnessed by
Dr. Horne (Exhibit 2), Dr. Horne's belief as stated
above would be entitled to considerable weight.
Sorensen's testimony also is to the effect that he
had not endorsed his certificate by the time the
Kartchner certificate was issued ( 180):
Q. (by lVIr. Tanner) "And is that the stock
ownership as you believed it to be November
1st, 1949?

A. (by Mr. Sorensen)

"No, October 31st,

Q. "On the evening of October 31st?

A. "Yes, let's put it that way.
Q. "Then subsequent to that time, and
prior to the time that the certificate was
handed to Mr. Kartchner, what, if any, of
that stock was actually returned and released?

A. "Dr. Horne's stock was returned to the
corporation.
Q. "As of what date?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
A. ''As of that date, I believe.
Q. "And that is the only stock that was
turned in at any time, is that right?

A. "11Jy stock was there, it was not endorsed.
Q. "In other words, it hadn't been turned
back?
A. "It hadn't been turned back.
Q. "That is correct, isn't it?

A. "That is correct."
Horne again testifies that it was not endorsed
(202):

Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "Prior to that time
had he given it to you?

A. (by Dr. Horne). "It was with our
certificates, as I recall, all together.
Q. "Was it signed on the back, that is,
was it endorsed or was that just where he kept
it?

A. "I don't know.
Q. "You don't know?

A. "I can't say for sure whether it was
signed or not signed.
Q. "Do you know whether that is where
Fred customarily kept his certificate?

A. "Yes, I believe I had seen it there
before with our certificates.
Q. "That is while he still owned them?

A. "While he still owned it, and after we
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had given ours to him, I think they were lying
in the drawer together, but he hadn't signed
his at that time because he didn't know who
was going to get it."
Dr. Horne's testimony shows that "we had given
ours to him" by mailing the certificates to Sorensen.
They were not received until after the Kartchner
certificate was issued. Hence, the time referred to
above must have been after November 1, 1949.
The uncontradicted testimony of the defendants
establishes that Sorensen's certificate was sent back
to the office of the corporation in a letter mailed October 31, 1949, and that it was not endorsed.
C. Finding No. 15, wherein it states, concerning the period after November 1, 1949.
"That plaintiff A. C. Kartchner kept the
books and records of said company and had
such records, including the stock book, under
his care and custody."
This is inaccurate only insofar as it fails to show
that the books and records of the company, including
the stockbook, were kept at the office of the corporation and equally accessible to the defendant Sorensen
and the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner.
D. Finding No. 16 wherein, referring to the
period of time during the negotiations preceding the
purchase of stock by the plaintiffs, it states:
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"That plaintiff A. C. Kartchner \vas advised by defendant Sorensen that if such stock
was not surrendered, Sorensen would be obliged to take a reduction of his proposed interest in said company, which was understood by
said parties and agreed to," and
"it \Yas considered by all concerned that
Sorensen was entitled to 42,000 shares of said
stock.''
There is evidence that Sorensen told the plaintiff
A. C. Kartchner that he would take a lesser interest
in the corporation if the Stanis. or Winder stock did
not come in, but there is no evidence anywhere in
the record that the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner was
so advised and there is no evidence that the plaintiff
Iren B. Kartchner ever was told, believed, or knew
that Sorensen was to have less than 100,000 shares of
stock. The only way the suggestion that there is no
evidence on a point can be verified is by reading the
record and finding it to be true. Perhaps, however,
the respondent will agree to the truth of the proposition and save the court that onerous task.
·-

E. Finding No. 17 wherein it states:
"That at the time of issuance to plaintiffs
of their certificate for 100,000 shares, there
was available for reissue in the treasury of said
corporation 142,000 shares of said common
stock, and that the said shares issued to plaintiffs did not constitute an overissue, but were
within the authorized limits as provided by
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the Articles of Incorporation of said corporation."
This concerns one of the most vital points in the
case. One of the prime problems is whether, as a
matter of law, the Kartchner certificate represented
an overissue. Except for the question of whether the
Sorensen certificate was endorsed, there is no conflict
relative to the facts on this point,lbut there is a conFlict
on the interpretation of their effect.
At the time of the issuance of the Kartchner
certificate for 100,000 shares of this common stock
of the defendant corporation to the plaintiffs, November 1, 1949, the Stanis stock, 10,000 shares, was not
surrendered and the Winder stock, 48,000, was not.
These two blocks of stock were never transferred to
the corporation for re-issue. On this point all parties
to this suit are in agreement.
The Horne stock, 41,000 shares, had been endorsed in blank and was, at the moment of issue
of the Kartchner certificate, in the United States mail
directed to the corporation, together with a letter
stating:
"Please find enclosed with this letter all
the stock certificates in my name, Lyman M.
Horne M.D., and those in the name of Myrtle
S. Horne. I am returning them to you as of
the above date. I do hereby, relinquish my
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interest in the Clicquot Club Bottling Company
of Salt Lake City.
Very sincerely,
(sgd) Lyman JVI. Horne, M.D.
Lyman M. Horne, M.D."
Whether this makes the Horne stock the property of the corporation and thus available for reissue is discussed later under point II (C) at pages
45 to 49 inclusive.
The Sorensen certificate, 101,000 shares, was in
the same envelope as the Horne certificates and Dr.
Horne's resignation as President. This is undisputed.
It was not endorsed (supra), and the envelope in
which it had been transmitted had not been received
at the corporation office at the time of the issuance
to the plaintiffs of their certificate for 100,000 shares.
The defendant Horne, whose testimony is the only
evidence on the point, states as follows ( 196) :
A. "(At the time I signed the Kartchner
certificate for 100,000 shares) I asked Mr. Sorensen, 'Should I sign the certificate; I sent you
a resignation last night.' He said 'I haven't
got it,' so officially the company hadn't received my resignation, so I was officially still
considered the company's president, so I signed
it." (Parentheses ours)
Since the Sorensen certificate was in the same
envelope as Horne's resignation, it follows that the
certificate had not been received at the corpo~ation
office.
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Relative to Sorensen's intention at this time concerning his stock it is important to note the abundant
testimony that Sorensen didn't know until some time
after November 1, 1949, whether the Stanis or
Winder stock would be surrendered and hence did
not know how much stock he would have to transfer
to the corporation in order to give the Kartchners
100,000 shares ( 198, 20 7, 208, 209, 216, 220, 232).
According to the defendant Horne, Sorensen
stated at the time of the issue of the Kartchner certificate that he was going to turn back his 101,000 shares
(197, 198):

Q. "Did you think Sorensen had turned
it back, his 101,000 at that time?
A. "No, I presume it could be completed
was for him to do that.

Q. "Did you assume he had?
A. "He said that is what he was going to
do. Whether he had done it a few months ago,
one way or the other, that is the arrangement."
This would squarely negative any finding that
Sorensen had previously or contemporaneously surrendered his stock.
The legal effect of these facts, like those concerning the Horne stock, is discussed under point
II (C) at pages 45 to 54 inclusive. There is is proposed that the proper finding would be that there
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'vas no stock available for issue at the time of the
issue of the Kartchner certificate for 100,000 shares
and, hence, that is constituted an overissue in its
entirety.
F. Finding No. 19 is as follows:
"That plaintiff A. C. Kartchner acted for
and in behalf of plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner,
his ,vife, in the negotiations and formation of
the contract aforesaid and handled her interest in said corporation at all times, and that
the said Irene B. Kartchner was bound by the
action of her husband and acquiesced therein."
The portion stating "that the said Irene B.
Kartchner was bound by the action of her husband
and acquiesced therein" is a conclusion of law, not
a finding of fact.
The evidence that is important relative to this
finding is the evidence:
(1) that the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner personally participated in some of the meetings leading
up to the stock purchase:
See the following testimony of the defendant
Sorensen ( 217) :
A. "I can't tell; there were so many
meetingts: - occasionally Mrs. Kartchner,
when we were in their home, she was there,
and I only remember on one other occasion
when somebody else was present, that is when
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Mr. Ralph Keddington was with us in Kartchner's home, so as to persons with us, that is
the only time I know."
(2) That she personally participated in the
meeting of September 20, 1949, when the price to
be paid for the stock was agreed upon ( 122);
(3) That she personally participated in the
November 1, 1949, meeting where she received the
stock certificate for which she paid ( 181, 182):
Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "Will you state
your name please?

A. "Irene Bain Kartchner.
Q. "Mrs. Kartchner, you are one of the
plaintiffs in this action?

A.

"Yes.

Q. "Were you present when the stock
certificate, which is the plaintiff's Exhibit "B"
was issued by the president and director of the
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lawe
City, November 1st, 1949?
A. "Yes, I was.
Q. "At that time, Mrs. Kartchner, did
you believe that to be a valid certificate?

A. "Yes.
Q. "Did you believe that is represented
100,000 shares of Clicquot Club stock?
A. "I thought so.
Q. "If you had not believed it was a valid
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stock certificate, reprsentiug 100,000 shares of
stock, \Yould you have paid for it?
A. "No.
Q. '·\iVas it a fact that half of the money
and property paid for this certificate \Vas property of yours?

A. "Yes.
Q. "Now, was there anything in the circumstances surrounding this transaction that
indicated to you, or made you feel that that
certificate was not a valid certificate?

A. "No."
(4) And that she handled some of her own
business matters and some of this particular business
matter, and talked it over with her husband. This
appears through the limiting portions of her follow-·
. ing testimony ( 182):
Q. (by Mr. Mulliner). "Mrs. Kartchner,
do you leave your business matters, especially
this particular one in regard to the Clicquot
Company, to your husband?

A. "Well, yes, sometimes.
Q. "Did you?

A. "Yes, most of it.
Q. "Did he act as your representative in
negotiating this transaction?

A. "Well, we talk it over together."
The burden of proof is on the defertdants to
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show that the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner vvas the agent
of the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner if they seek to
bind her by any knowledge he may have had, or
by his acts. As set forth above, the evidence shows
a substantial personal participation by Mrs. Kartchner in the negotiations and further shows:
( 1) That ·she sometimes leaves her business matters to her husband, but not always,
(2) That she left most of the business
matters in regard to the Clicquot Company to
her husband, but not all of it, and
(3) That they talked the matter over
together.
All of the above acts on Mrs. Kartchner's part
are as equally consistent with the position of "busi- .
ness adviser" and "one being advised" so far as this
transaction is concerned as they are with agency.
Further, they are as consistent vvith simple joint tenancy as they are with agency. The evidence on the
point of agency is clearly insufficient to sustain a
finding that relation existed between the plaintiffs.
If, however, the court did believe the testimony
showed an agency relation, there is a complete lack
of proof of when Mrs. Kartchner did and when she
did not leave this particular business matter in Mr.
Kartchner's hands, and the court, in the absence of
proof cannot presume, and will not guess when the
claimed agency was in force and was not. A finding
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that an agency relation existed at any stated time
so as to bind Mrs. Kartchner for Mr. Kartchner's
knowledge or acts at that time would have to be
based on pure conjecture.
For these reasons the plaintiffs believe there can
be no finding of agency, and hence no binding of
the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner by the actions or
knowledge of the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner.
G. Finding No. 20 states:
"That no false representations were made
to Plaintiffs, or either of them by Defendants,
or either of them, with regard to the amount
of accounts payable owed by Clicquot Club
Bottling Company or as to the condition of the
stock holdings of said corporation. That said
stock was issued to Plaintiffs in good faith, and
full disclosure of all facts were made in the
negotiations between them, and that the stock
holding of Plaintiffs, in the amount of 100,000
shares, has at all times been admitted and recognized by all Defendants."
There is a conflict in the evidence relative to the
representations concerning the amount of accounts
payable owed by the defendant corporation. Hence,
there is some evidence to sustain a finding that there
were no false representations made in that regard.
However, there is no conflict relative to the proposition that the defendants both in fact and in law
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represented the Kartchner certificate to be valid and
genuine, or, in the words of Sorensen, "good." There
is no conflict in the evidence that the defendant
Horne represented himself to be the President of
the defendant corporation when he signed the
Kartchner certificate as "President." The evidence
is undisputed on which the proposition is based that
the act of issuing the certificate constitutes certain
representations as a matter of law. Hence, if, in
fact, Horne was not President of the defendant corporation, or the Kartchner certificate was not valid
and genuine, and did not pass title to 100,000 shares
of the common stock of the defendant corporation,
those representations were false. The plaintiffs will
show later in this brief that, as a matter of law, the
certificate was not genuine or valid, but was and is
void and passes no title for any stock, also that Horne
terminated his tenure as President of the defendant
corporation before he signed the certificate, and thus
his representation that he was President was false.
If the plaintiff;s propositions are upheld that the
stock is void as an overissue, it is apparent that there
cannot have been a full disclosure of all the facts.
Particularly since there is an absolute and complete
lack of evidence of any disclosure to Mrs. Kartchner
concerning the future stock holdings of the other
shareholders besides herself and Mr. Kartchner.
That the stock holdings of the plaintiffs have
been at all times admitted and recognized by all of
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the defendants is immaterial since an issue of stock
which is ultra vires for the reason that it is an overissue cannot be validated by any subsequent act of
the corporation or its officers. There is no power in
a corporation to issue more stock than is authorized
by its charter.
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, vol. 12, Sec.
5144:
"·\Vhere there is an overissue, the increase
and the certificates are void because of the
· fact that it is beyond the powers of the corporation to create and issue the additional stock,
and the holders of the certificates, therefore,
whether they be the original holders or their
bona fide transferees, do not become stockholders; and the holders of such illegal stock
cannot be relieved by an issue of stock, or compel the corporation to recognize them as stockholders. The rule that a corporation cannot
issue shares beyond the amount authorized by
the legislature prevents a court from compelling the issuance of a certificate of stock to one
claiming to be entitled thereto, where an overissue would result therefrom. An unauthorized
increase of capital stock is none the less void
because made by unanimous agreement
among the stockholders, and under an honest
misapprehension as to their powers."
See also discussion and cases cited in the last
portion of the Argument under point IIC at pages
52 to 54 inclusive and point VIII at pages 67, 68
and 69.
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Point II

The Trial Court Failed to Make Findings of Fact
Which Uncontroverted Evidence Requires.
For the convenience of the Court, we will not
restate here all the facts as we believe they should be
found. Most of the facts are set forth in the Statement of Facts at the beginning of this brief. It is
the contention of the appellants that the trial court
should have made findings in accordance with the
facts in said Statement, together with those hereafter
urged, and the propositions of law will be argued in
the light of the facts as thus stated.
Those findings which the Court did not make,
but should have made, will be dealt with one at
a time, but are summarized as follows:
A. That Sorensen orally represented that the
Kartchner stock was good at the time the Kartchner
certificate was issued.
B. That by the act of signing and issuing the
certificate, both Horne and Sorensen made certain
material representations concerning its genuineness
and validity.
C. That each of those representations was false
when made.
D. That the defendants and each of them knew
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the facts that made their representations false, and
made those representations either knowing them to
be false, or without knowing them to be true.
E. That the plaintiffs, and each of them, were
entitled to rely and did rely upon the false representations of the defendants and each of them, to their
damage in the amount of $18,046.53.
A

The Court should have found that the defendant
Sorensen orally represented to the plaintiff A. C.
Kartchner that the stock which was outstanding had
been returned to the treasury of the corporation and
that the Kartchner certificate was good.
The only evidence relative to this proposition is
the testimony of the plaintiffs A. C. Kartchner in
answer to questions by Mr. Arnovitz as follows ( 172,
173):
Q. (by Mr. Arnovitz). "Mr. Kartchner,
you asked to have the stock certificate delivered to you knowing that some of the other
certificates had not yet been turned into the
company, is that correct?
A. (by Mr. Kartchner). "That is not
correct.
Q. "What is the fact?
A. "In October, when we come to the
agreement I would go in, I was to go up November 1st and go to work. At that time that
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give Mr. Sorensen one months time, practically, to get the stock back in, have it all fixed
up. I came up that day and I asked if the stock
was all good, he said 'Yes it was good.' "
The defendant Sorensen nowhere in his testimony denied this proposition. Whether this representation is important depends on whether the
Kartchner stock was "good" when issued, i.e., on
whether the representation is true or false. This is
discussed later.
B

The trial court should have found that defendant
Horne made the following material representations
to each of the plaintiffs:
1. That he was, at the time of the signing and
issuing of the Kartchner certificate on November 1,
1949, the duly authorized and acting President of
the defendant corporation.
2. That he knew of nothing which would or
might make his acts as such President invalid.
3. That the certificate for 100,000 shares of
stock of said corporation was genuine and valid.
4. That the certificate passed the title to 100,000
shares of the capital stock of said corporation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
5. That there \Yere no facts vvhich were or
should have
. been known to him which ·would render
said certificate, or any portion thereof, invalid.

The trial court should have found that the defendant Sorensen made the sarne Inaterial representations to each of the plaintiffs, except that he represented that he \vas a Director and that he knevv of
nothing v:hich \Yould make his own acts as Director
invalid or Horne's acts as President invalid.
The scope of the representations that a corporate
officer makes vvhen he signs and issues, or signs for
issue, a corporate stock certificate or other security
is a matter of construction in each case. When he
signs in a space clearly labeled as being the space for
the signature of an officer of the corporation, he necessarily represents to anyone receiving the certificate
that he is that officer. The defendant I-Iorne signed
on the signature line of the Kartchner certificate
above the word "President" and the defendant Sorensen signed above the word "Director." (See Exhibit
"B".) Ordinary common sense dictates the conclusion
that they, by so signing, represent themselves to be
those officers in that corporation.
It seems implicit in the above conclusion that
the defendant Horne also represented that he had not
resigned his office as President. Further, since he
is the one who would know if he had done anything
vvhich would throw his status as President in quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion, he should be held to represent by his signing
the certificate for issue to the Kartchners that he had
done nothing which would, or might, destroy his
authority to act as such President, and hence would,
or might, render such acts invalid. Here, the defendant Horne had signed and mailed to the corporation
an explicit letter of resignation and all of his stock.
He should be held liable for the consequence of those
acts.
Further, by signing the certificate, both Horne
and Sorensen represented the certificate to be genuine and valid, and that it was not invalid by reason
of their own acts or omissions. This is established by
the following cases:

Windram vs. French, 151 Mass. 547,24 N.E. 914,
8 L.R.A. 750:
"There is no doubt that, by thus authenticating and issuing the certificates, the defendants made certain representations which accompanied them, and which, like the offer in
a letter of credit, addressed themselves to whoever should purchase those certificates thereafter, whoever he might be. Bruff vs. Mali, 36
N.Y. 200, 205. See Bartholomew vs. Bentley,
15 Ohio 659; Clark vs. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106; First
National Bank vs. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369, 378;
Matthews vs. Bank, 1 Holmes 396; Lobdell vs.
Baker, 3 Mete. 469, 471.
"The scope of these representations is matter of construction. They certainly went to
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the point that the stock \\'as not spurious, and
that it \Yas not invalid by reason of the fraudulent or kno\Yn acts or omissions of the officers
in question."

--

J.\!lcDonald vs. Reich and Lieure, Inc., 100 Cal.
App. 736, 281 P. 106, at p. 108. (Though not closely
analagous to the present case, this case contains the
following language.)
"When a corporation issues to the public
certificates of stock, regular on their face, it
amounts substantially to a representation that
the certificates are regular and valid. Certificates of stock so issued by a corporation, but
which were irregular or void for reasons not
participated in by the stockholder, have been
held to amount to a misrepresentation and
fraud upon the part of the corporation officials
for which the corporation is answerable. Citing Green vs. Caribou Oil Mining Company,
179 Cal. 787, 178 Pac. 950; Sykes vs. Pure Food
Cider Company, 157 Iowa, 601, 138 N.W. 554;
Windram vs. French, 151 Mass. 547, 24 N.E.
914, 8 L.R.A. 750."

Daniels vs. Craiglow, 131 Kan. 500, 292 P. 771.
"* * * by authenticating and issuing the
share certificate, the president and secretary
represented to plaintiff that the sale was not
tainted with illegality on account of omission
to procure a Blue Sky permit." Citing Windram vs. French, supra.
Sykes vs. Pure Food Cider Co., et al, 138 N.W.
554, 157 Iowa 601.
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"Had plaintiff purchased the shares of
stock from defendant, then there could have
been no doubt as to the liability of the latter.
In authenticating and issuing the certificates
of stock, the defendant, in connection with Albrook, as officers of the company, made the
representations•contained therein, and implied
from their issuance, '"Jhich, like the offer of
a letter of credit, addressed themselves to whoever should purchase these certificates thereafter, whoever he might be.'" Citing Windram vs. French, supra, Bruff vs. Mali, supra,
First National Bank vs. Lanier, supra, and
Stickel vs. Atwood, post.

Stickel vs. Atwood, 25 R.I. 456, 56 Atl. 687.
This case holds that the president of a corporation who participated in the issuance of bonds which
falsely represent that they are secured by all the
property of a corporation, is liable in an action for
deceit by the purchaser of the bonds, though the
president was ignorant of the sale in question.
The record establishes that Horne signed the
certificate knowing it was to be issued to the Kartchners. According to his own testimony:
Q. "At the time you signed the certificate you know the certificate was for 100,000
shares of stock?

A. "Yes.
Q. "You knew it was a certificate to be
purchased by Irene and A. C. Kartchner did
you not?
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A. "'Yes, that is correct.
Q. "'At that timeA. "I don't know about Irene; let me
look at that?

Q. "By lVIr. and 1\tirs. Kartchner, let's
put it that \vay?

A. "All right.
Q. "'It that true?

A. "Yes."
There is no question that Sorensen knew with,
whom he \Yas dealing, as he prepared the certificate
to be issued to the Kartchners and handed it to them.
It requires no ingenuity to see that representations that a stock certificate is genuine and valid, and
that the officers are the persons they purport to be
are material representations.

c.
The Court should have found that each of the
material representations set forth in B. above was
false when made. Dealing with each representation
separately, the reasons are as follows:
1. The representation that Dr. Horne was, at
the time he signed and issued the Kartchner certificate, the duly authorized and acting President of the
corporation was false because (a) Dr. Horne had reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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signed his office the previous day and (b) if title to
his stock passed to the corporation the previous day
(we doubt that it did) he was disqualified to hold
that office thereafter.
(a) Dr. Horne, on October 31, 1949, wrote to
the Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake
City, a letter saying:
"I, hereby, resign as president of the company and director of the company (Clicquot
Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake City)."
He mailed that letter to the office of the bottling
company, which was on the floor below that of his
office and in the same building. His intention is
shown by his testimony ( 110 and 111 ) .

.Q. (by Mr. Tanner) "Let's see, at one
time, Dr. Horne, you were president of the
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake
City, were you not?
A. "Yes.
Q. "You resigned October 31st, 1949, did
you not?
A. "Right."
His intention is further shown by the word
''hereby'' in the letter of resignation. However, there
is the following testimony by Horne ( 196) :
A. (by Horne) "Yes, I asked Mr. Sorensen, 'Should I sign the certificate; I sent you
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a resignation last night.~ l-Ie said, 'I haven't
got it,' so officially the company hadn't received my resignation, so I \Vas officially still
considered the company's president, so I signed
it."
The effect of mailing that resignation is established in the case of Security Investors' Realty Co. vs.
Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County, et al,
101 Cal. App. 450, 281 P. 709, where a summons
was attempted to be served on a secretary of a corporation who had tendered his resignation by depositing
it in the United States mail, directed to the Security
Investors' Realty Co. and J. Meyer, President thereof.
That case holds as follows:
"It would therefore follow that the resignation of Shirley E. Meserve as secretary and
as director vvas complete and effective, and
that service in this case had upon him as an
officer of the corporation was the same as if
made upon a stranger."

The proposition for which this case stands is
stated in the headnote prepared by the court, as follows:
"Where secretary and director of corporation deposited resignation in writing in mail,
directed to corporation and president thereof,
resignation was complete and effective, notwithstanding by-laws to effect that each director should serve term for which elected and
until successor should quality, and that officers
should be elected annually and hold office
until successors were appointed."
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In the a hove case, there was no evidence whatever that the resignation was ever received by the
corporation, only that it had been mailed.
The case of Harry Levi and Co., Inc. vs. Feldman,
et al, 61 N.Y.S. 2d, 639, holds that a resignation
stating that it takes effect at once becomes effective
when tendered and the authority of the officers may
not thereafter be revived by his own act. The precise
holding is as follows:
"The resignation of Harry Levi as President and Director states that it was to take
effect at once. It became effective when tendered. * * * (citing cases) * * *. Any voluntary
acts on his part subsequent thereto would not
thereby revive in him the office of President
without his election thereto pursuant to the
by-laws of the corporation * * * (citing cases)

****"
(b) If the title to Dr. Horne's stock passed to
the corporation at the time it was mailed on October
31, 1949, that fact standing alone would disqualify
him to hold the office of President and Director
thereafter. He would, therefore, be completely without authority to sign the Kartchner certificate on
November 1, 1949.
The articles of incorporation of the defendant
corporation were placed in evidence at the trial; however, it appears that they were not transmitted to
this court with the Record on Appeal. The portion
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of those articles "·ith \vhich we are now concerned
is .Article 7, \Yhich reads as follows:
"The number and kind of officers of the
corporation shall be as folln\-vs; A board of six
director, one of \Yhom shall be President, one
of \vhom shall be Vice-President, one shall be
Second \'ice-President, one may be Secretary,
and one may be the Treasurer of the corporation; the office of Secretary and Treasurer may
be held by the same person; each person to
be eligible to election as director must be the
holder and owner, in his or her name, of at
least one share of the common stock of the
corporation, as shown by the books of the
corporation; four members of the board of
directors shall be necessary or form a quorum,
and be authorized to transact the business and
exercise the corporation powers of the corporation."
Section 18-2-20, U.C.A., 1943, provides as follows:
"The corporate powers of the corporation
shall be exercised by the board of directors,
who shall be stockholders of the company, and
at least one of whom shall be a resident of this
state; * * * *"
It is apparent that if, on October 31, 1949, Dr.
Horne ceased to be a stockholder of the company he
could not be a Director thereof, under the express
provisions of the statute above set forth. If he could
not be a Director, he was not qualified to be the PresSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ident of the corporation, for the reason that the
Articles of Incorporation provide that the President
shall be "one of a board of six directors."
If Dr. Horne was not the President, whether
he believed himself to be President or not, the Kartchner certificate would not have been genuine for the
reason that the signature in the "President" space
was not that of the President.

2. The representation that he (Dr. Horne)
knew of nothing which would or might make his
acts as such President invalid is false because Dr.
Horne knew he had signed and sent in his resignation
and, at the very least, knew that this might terminate
his authority to act in that capacity. Further, he is
held to know the provisions of the articles of the defendant corporation and to know that when he ceased
to be a stockholder he ceased to be qualified to be a
Director and the President. He certainly knew he
had sent his stock to the corporation on the previous
day, endorsed, with a letter purporting to terminate
his interest in it.
3. The representation that the certificate for
100,000 shares of stock of said corporation was genuine and valid was false because (a) Horne was not
the President and hence his signature as such would
destroy the genuineness of that certificate, and (b)
the certificate was an overissue in its entirety and
hence void.
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The proposition that Dr. Horne was not the President of the defendant corporation when he signed
the certificate has been discussed above. The propo-

sition that the stock certificate was an overissue when
made IS THE L110ST INJPORTANT SINGLE PROP-

OSITION I1V THE CASE AND GOES TO THE HEART
OF THE APPEAL.

For the following reasons the certificate constituted an overissue of stock:
In the State of Utah, the law controlling the
transfer of title to shares of stock is the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, Sec. 18-3 U.C.A., 1943. The portions
of that act with which we are here concerned are:
"18-3-1 Exclusive Manner of Transfer.
Title to a certificate and to the shares
represented thereby can be transferred only:
( 1) By delivery of the certificate indorsed either in blank or to a specified person
by the person appearing by the certificate to
be the owner of the shares represented thereby; or

( 2) By delivery of the certificate and a
separate document containing a written assignment of the certificate or a power of attorney
to sell, assign or transfer the same or the shares
represented thereby, signed by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner of
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ment or power of attorney may be either in
blank or to a specified person.
The provisions of this section shall be a pplicable although the charter or articles of incorporation or code of regulations or by-laws of
the corporation issuing the certificate and the
certificate itself provide that the shares represented thereby shall be transferrable only on
the books of the corporation or shall be registered by a transfer agent.

18-3-9 Delivery of Certificate Without Indorsement.
The delivery of a certificate by the person
appearing by the certificate to be the ovvner
thereof without the indorsement requisite for
the tranfer of the certificate and the shares represented thereby but with intent to transfer
such certificate or shares shall impose an obligation, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, upon the person so delivering to
complete the transfer by making the necessary
indorsement. The transfer shall take effect as
of the time when the indorsement is actually
made. This obligation may be specifically enforced. (Italics ours.)

18-3-18 Indorsement, How Made.
A certificate is indorsed when an assignment or a power of attorney to sell, assign or
transfer the certificate or the shares represented thereby is written on the certificate and
signed by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby, or when the signature of such
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person is vvritten without more upon the back
of the certificate. In any of such cases a certificate is indorsed though it has not been delivered.
''18-3-20 Definitions.
( 1) In this chapter, unless the context
or subject matter otherwise requires:
"Delivery" means voluntary transfer of
possession from one person to another.
"Person" includes a corporation or partnership or two or more persons having a joint
of common interest.
"Transfer" means transfer of legal title."
On October 31, 1949, there was no common
stock in the treasury of the defendant Clicquot Club
Bottling Company of Salt Lake City, since all 200,000
shares had been issued and were then outstanding.
Our problem is to ascertain whether, at the moment
on November 1, 1949, that the Kartchner certificate
was issued to the plaintiffs by the defendants, there
was sufficient stock available for issue tn enable the
issuance of 100,000 shares. It seems obvious that the
only stock available for issue would be stock the title
to which had passed back to the corporation.
The Stanis and Winder stock, 58,000 shares, was,
and still is, outstanding in them. The balance of
142,000 shares was comprised of the Horne and Sorensen stock.
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The Horne stock was endorsed by the owners
in blank and placed in an envelope directed to the
company, together with a letter saying'
"Please find enclosed with ths letter all
of the stock certificates in my name, Lyman
M. Horne, M.D., and those in the name of
Myrtle S. Horne. I am returning them to you
as of the above date. I do, hereby, relinquish
my interest in the Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake City."
The envelope containing this letter and stock
was mailed and had not been received at the corporation office prior to the issuance of the Kartchner
certificate.
DILEMMA

If delivery of those certificates was complete
when mailed, the defendant Horne ceased to be a
stockholder on October 31,1949, by virtue of that fact
alone, separate and apart from his resignation, and
hence his authority to be President terminated at
that moment because he was, at that moment, disqualified from holding office. See discussion of this
point under II C 1 above.
If delivery of those certificates was complete
when they were received in the mail from Horne,
the title to them was not in the corporation and they
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were not az ·ailable for issue at the time of the issuance
of the Kartchner certificate.
The latter of the above propositions is the one
the plaintiffs assert to be the case. vVhen delivery of
stock is made by mail, the process of delivery begins
with the mailing and ends with the arrival of the
stock, via mail man, at the place to which it is addressed. "Delivery" is defined as the voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another. This
does not mean transfer to just any other person whatsoever, rather it means to the person to whom title
is to pass or his agent. In the principal case, although
he was only a few steps away from the corporation
office, Dr. Horne chose to mail his certificates. H~
deliberately chose a circuitous route of delivery and
caused the actual handing over of the stock to be
forestalled for a day. It is the view of the plaintiffs
that delivery of that stock was complete, and title
passed, when the agency chosen by Horne deposited
the certificates in the office of the corporation, i.e.,
of the person to whom they were to be delivered.
That point of time was some time after the Kartchner
certificate had been issued and may or may not
have been on November 1, 1949.
What, then, of the Sorensen stock? His 101,000
shares would more than cover the Kartchner certificate if they had been in the treasury when the Kartchner certificate was issued.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50
In the first place, Sorensen never delivered his
stock to the corporation. Horne, apparently on his
own, with no instructions to do so, put Sorensen's
certificate in with his and Mrs. Horne's when he
mailed them. The reason .for this is found in the
letters of transmittal. Dr. Horne was severing all relation with the defendant corporation and, in the
course of so doing, was returning to Fred Sorensen
all of the documents pertaining to the defendant corporation which were still in his possession. Sorensen
didn't even know the certificates were on their way
to him until Dr. Horne told him so at the time Sorensen took the Kartchner certificate to him to be
signed. He says (229, 230):

Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "After the Doctor
said he told you that day (the day the Kartchner certificate was issued) he mailed the certificates, did you know prior to that time he
mailed them to you? (Parentheses ours.)

A. "No."
Further, Sorensen himself believed his stock had
not been turned back to the corporation ( 180) :
Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "Then subsequent
to that time, and prior to the time that the
certificate was handed to Mr. Kartchner,
what, if any, of the stock was actually returned
and released?

A. (by Sorensen). Dr. Horne's stock was
returned to the corporation.
Q. "As of what date?
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A. "As of that date, I believe. (November
1, 1949)
Q. "And that is the only stock that was
turned in at that time, is that right?

A. "My stock was there, it was not endorsed.
Q. "In other words, it hadn't been turned
back?

A. "It hadn't been turned back.
Q. "That is correct, isn't it?

A. "That is correct." (Parentheses ours.)
It would put an undue strain on the evidence to
conclude that when Dr. Horne sent Sorensen's certificate back to him in an envelope addressed to the
corporation, Sorensen thereby delivered the stock to
the corporation in accordance with the requirements
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
However, even if that remarkable result were
achieved, it still would avail the defendants nothing,
for the Sorensen certificate had not been endorsed.
(See above.) This fact is shown by Sorensen's and
Horne's clear testimony as set forth in the argument
under point I B. above; The Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, Sec. 18-3-9 (set forth in full above) provides for
delivery without endorsement and states that such
delivery imposes the duty of endorsement, but "The
transfer shall take effect as of the time the endorsement is actually made." The conclusion is inescapSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52
able that the Sorensen stock was not available for
re-issue until the time, some time after the issue of
the Kartchner certificate, when Sorensen placed on
that certificate the signature which is on it now
(Exhibit 2).
It is, then, clear that at the time the Kartchner
certificate "vas issued it was an overissue in its entirety, since the corporation had not re-acquired title
to a single share of stock by the time of the issue. As
such it is absolutely and irreparably void.

That an overissue is void is established by the
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article XII, Section 5:

"* * * The stock of corporations shall not
be increased, except in pursuance of general
law, nor shall any law authorize the increase
of stock without the consent of the person or
persons holding the larger amount in value of
the stock, or without due notice of the proposed
increase having previously been given in such
manner as may be prescribed by law. All fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall
be void.''
It is clearly recognized by the textbooks:

Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent
Edition, Vol. II, Sec 5144 at pages 243 and 323:
"Where there is an overissue, the increase
and the certificates are void because of the
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fact that it is beyond the povvers of the corporation to create and issue the additional
stock, and the holders of the certificates, therefore, ·whether they be the original holders or
their bona fide transferees, do not become
stockholders, * * *."
"Of course a corporation has no power
to issue certificates in excess of the an1ount
of its authorized capital stock. If it does so,
there is an overissue or unauthorized increase
and the certificates are void, and neither confer rights nor impose liabilities as a stockholder, and the corporation may be liable in
damages to bona fide purchases and holders of
the pretended stock."
The case of Pruitt vs. Oklahoma Steam Baking
Company, et al, 39 Okla. 509, 136 P. 730, is a case
where 100 shares of the capital stock of the defendant
company were issued after the full amount of the
authorized capital stock had already been issued. The
effect of this is discussed as follows:
"The act, therefore, of the baking company in issuing to plaintiff the 100 shares of
its stock, in excess of the amount limited and
prescribed by its articles of incorporation, was
a nullity. It is said in Cook on Stock and Stockholders, Section 292, in stating the law on this
subject: 'By overissued stock is to be understood stock issued in excess of the amount limited and prescribed by the act of incorporation.
Certificates of stock issued in excess of the certificates that represent the full authorized capital stock of the corporation represent overSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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issued stock. Such stock is spurious and wholly
void. This is the settled law, and it prevails
equally whether the over-issue is the result
of accident or mistake, or want of knowledge
of the law, or is due to fraud and intentional
wrong-doing. The animus or intent of the parties to the over-issue is not material. Overissued stock, no matter hovv over-issued, represents nothing and is wholly and entirely valueless and void. So rigid and well established is
this rule that not even a bona fide holder of
such stock can give to it any validity or vitality.' Both by statute and at common law the
issuance of the stock, delivered to plaintiff in
exchange for his land, as we have seen, "\'vas
void and not merely voidable at the plaintiff's
election."
This is later affirmed in the State of Oklahoma

in the case of Garnett vs. State ex rel. Bank Commissioner, 19 P. 2d, 375, and the cases following. It
is held to be the law in Kansas, in the case of Trapp
vs. Railroad Men's Refining Company, 114 Kan. 618,
220 P. 249. In the State of Utah, in the case of East
River Bottom Water Company vs. Boyce, 102 Utah
149, 128 P. 2d 277, referred to and affirmed in East
River Bottom Water Company vs. Dunford, 167 P.
2d 693, it was held that a duplicate issue of seven
shares was and is void, even in the hands of a bona
fide holders, thus affirming the general rule above.
4. The representation of Dr. Horne that the
certificate passed the title to 100,000 shares of the
capital stock of the defendant corporation was false
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because that certificate was void at the moment is
was issued and could have no effect as an instrument
of property.

5. The representation of Dr. Horne that there
were no facts which were or should have been known
to him which would render said certificate, or any
portion thereof, invalid is palpably false. He knew
he had resigned, though he may not have known
the legal effect of it; he knew he had sent back all
of his stock and, not being a stockholder could not
be President or a Director; and he knew that Sorensen's certificate was unendorsed and that neither
his, his wife's or Sorensen's certificate had reached
the company by the time he signed the Kartchner
certificate. But even knowing all of these facts, Dr.
Horne went ahead, heedless of the rights of the
Kartchners and of his duty to them and signed and
issued the certificate, expecting them to rely on his
signature and its validity, and expecting them to pay
for it.
That the defendant Sorensen's representations
were false is established by the same reasoning that
applies to the representations of the defendant Dr.
Horne.

D.
The court should have found that the defendants
and each of them knew the facts that made their
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representations false, and made those representations
either knowing them to be false or without knowing
them to be true.
The facts essential to the falsity of the representations of the defendants are that Dr. Horne had resigned his office as President and Director and had
mailed his certificates to the corporation, and that
no shares had been returned to the corporation for
re-issue by the time of the issuance of the Kartchner
certificate.
That Dr. Horne knew he had resigned is, of
course, a necessary conclusion from his letters of resignation. That he told Sorensen he had resigned is
directly stated by the defendant Horne ( 196). So
Sorensen, too, knew Horne had resigned. But this
deterred neither of them. They went right ahead
without even investigating the effect of that resignation, and issued the certificates for which the plaintiffs were to pay $18,000.00
That Dr. Horne knew Sorensen's stock had not
been transferred to the corporation for re-issue is
implicit in his testimony that Soresen was going to
transfer his stock to the corporation (197, 198). That
Sorensen knew he had not transferred his stock to
the corporation is a necessary conclusion from the
fact that Sorensen didn't know, until the time on
November 1, 1949, when Dr. Horne told him so,
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poration and from his testimony (180), that his stock
had not been turned back by the time the Kartchner
stock was issued.
An examination of the stub in the stockbook
(Exhibit "l\II'') shows that, at the time the Kartchner
certificate 'Yas issued it was not even purported to
be covered by previously surrendered stock. See stub
for certificate 15 and compare with the stuns for
certificates 12 and 13.

E.
The court should have found that the plaintiffs,
and each of them, were entitled to rely and did rely
upon the false representations of the defendants and
each of them, to their damage in the amount of
$18,046.53.
That the plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon
the representations of the President and managing
Director of a corporation relative to the stock of that
corporation can scare be doubted. That the defendants and each of them did, in fact, so rely, is shown
by the testimony discussed hereafter at pages 63
and 64.
There has never been any doubt cast upon the
evidence of the plaintiffs ( 136), supported by Exhibit "L" that they paid $18,046.53 from their joint
funds and assets for their certificate for 100,000
shares of the stock of the defendant corporation. Since
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the evidence on this point is uncontroverted, the court
should have found that the amount of damage each
plaintiff sustained was one-half of $18,046.53.
Point III

Officers and Directors Occupy a Fiduciary Relation to Persons to Whom They Seek to Sell Stock in
the Corporation of Which They Are Officers.
The same reasoning which holds promoters, officers and directors of a corporation to be fiduciaries
as to the corporation and all of its stockholders, dictates that those persons should be held to be in a
fiduciary relation with those whom they induce
to become stockholders. That this is the law is
set forth in the case of Wills vs. Nehalem Coal Co.,
52 Or. 70, 96 P. 528, at page 531, as follows:
"The principle upon which courts of equity proceed in these cases is a very familiar one.
The promoter of a company, like its directors,
is deemed to sustain towards the members of
the company the relation of a trustee toward
his cestui que trust.* * * This confidential relationship extends not only to present stockholders, but to persons whom they invite or
solicit to subscribe for or purchase shares in
the company, and their intentional omission to
disclose facts to intending subscribers is as
much fraud as a positive misrepresentation.
14 A. and E. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 78."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

59
The above proposition is reaffirmed in' the case
of Rugger z's. 1\lt. Hood Electirc Co., 20 P. 2d 412,
143 Or. 193; re-hearing denied, 21 P. 2d, 1100, 143
Or. 193.
Both defendants were directors in the defendant
corporation and Dr. Horne was the President. The
standard of conduct to which each must be held in
his dealings with the Kartchners is that of a fiduciary. As fiduciaries, their failure to disclose to the
Kartchners that the stock which would be required
to make their certificate valid had not been transferred to the corporation and their faulure to disclose
the facts concerning Dr. Horne's resignation, make
them liable for any damages resulting to the Kartchners by virtue of those nondisclosures.
Point IV

It Is the Duty of Officers and Directors to Know
That Material Statments in Stock Certificates and the
Representations Implicit In Their Signing and Issuing Those Certificates Are True.
In Utah directors are charged by statute with
knowledge of corporate affairs.
Section 18-2-27, U.C.A., 1943:
"Every director of a corporation is deemed
to possess such a knowledge of the affairs of
his corporation as to enable him to determine
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whether any act, proceeding or omission of
the board is a violation of law."
The main reason for charging the directors with
knowledge of the corporate affairs, irrespective of
their actual knowledge, is that the directors are the
ones designated by law to exercise the powers of the
corporation.
Section 18-2-20, U.C.A., 1943:
"The corporate powers of the corporation
shall be exericsed by the board of directors,
who shall be stockholders of the company,*

* *"
That this duty exists relative to bonds issued by
a corporation is clearly set out in the case of Minnie
I. Ashby vs. Richard C. Peters, et al, 128 Neb. 338,
258 N.W. 639, 99 A.L.R. 843, which states, headnote

1,
"It is the duty of directors to know that
material statments in bonds issued under their
authority, as in the case at bar, and for the
benefit of their company are true. Such directors are liable for damages sustained by
anyone buying such bonds who relied upon
the truth of such statements which are now
provided to have been false when made."
The a hove case has much in common with the
case at bar, except that it holds officers personally
liable who are guilty of less misconduct and have
less actual knowledge than in the present case. Three
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directors who had no actual knowledge of the falsity
of statements contained in certain bonds and who
made no personal representations to the purchaser
of them, "vere held personally liable to that purchaser
for the loss sustained by her on the bonds.
In the principal case, Dr. Horne was a director,
as was Sorensen. Horne made no statements directly
to the purchasers of the stock, but only signed and
issued the stock certificate. Horne claims that he
is not liable because he did not knowingly make any
statements to the purchasers, let alone false statements. However, Horne is liable because he was a
Director and the President of the corporation and
is chargeable with a much higher duty than would
otherwise be the case. Upon him the law places the
task of examining to see if statements made in securities issued by him are, in fact, true.

See annotation at 99 A.L.R. 852 on this subject.
See Ward vs. Trimble, 103 Ky. 153, 44 S.VV.... 450,
where a bank president was held to be conclusively
presumed to have knowledge ofits affairs, rendering
him liable for deceit in the sale of its stock.
Hence, Dr. Horne as President-Director is conclusively presumed to know the effect of his acts and
whether there was stock available to make the Kartchner stock valid when issued. Such stock was not
available in fact and both the defendants Horne and
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Sorensen are bound by law to the knowledge of that
fact, irrespective of their actual knowledge, which
was substantial.
Point V

Such Officers and Directors Are Personally Liable to Persons Who Relied Upon the Truth of Those
Representations Which Are Proved To Have Been
False When Made.
This proposition is established by the following
cases:

Windram vs. French, supra.
Ashby vs. Peters, supra.
Cases at 99 A.L.R. 852.
Sykes vs. Pure Food Cider Co., et al. supra.
Stickel vs. Atwood, supra.
Tlwmpson on Corporation, 2d edition, Sec.
3554, states:
"The purchaser of overissued stock, or his
good faith transferee~ may recover his damages
in an action against the officers directly responsible for the overissue,* * * (citing cases)

* * *"
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, Permanent Edition, Vol. 11, Sec. 5144, at page 246, says:
"A corporation, and under some circumstances its directors, officers or agents, may be
held answerable in damages or otherwise, by
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stockholders and bona fide purchasers for an
unauthorized increase or an overissue."
That the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner relied upon
the representation of Horne and Sorensen that the
certificate was good for 100,000 shares of Clicquot
Club's stock and was valid and genuine is shown by
the only evidence on that point, as follows ( 184,
185):
Q. (by Mr. Tanner) "Were you present
·when the stock certificate, which is plantiff's
Exhibit 'B,' was issued by the president and
director of the Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake City, Noven1.ber 1st, 1948?"
A.

(by Mrs. Kartchner) "Yes, I was."

Q. "At that time, Mrs. Kartchner, did
you believe that to be a valid certificate?"

A. "Yes."
Q. "Did you believe that it represented
100,000 shares of Clicquot Club stock?"

A. "I thought so."

Q. "If you had not believed it was a valid
stock certificate representing 100,000 shares
of stock, would you have paid for it?"
A. "No."
The plaintiff A. C. Kartchner said ( 133):
Q. (by Mr. Tanner) "Did you believe
what he said to be true?"

A. "I believed Mr. Sorensen, yes. Heappeared to me like an honest man and the way
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he talked I thought he meant what he said and
I believed everything he told me. I had no reason to doubt if he thought we could do it, we
could do it."

* * * * *
Q. "When you received the stock certificate for 100,000 shares of stock, did you believe
that gave you half of the business?"
A. "I did."
Q. "Would you h:~ve paid for that stock
certificate if you had believed otherwise?"
A. "No."
The record is replete with testimony and with
evidence of the actions of the plaintiffs which clearly
show that they relied on the representations implicit
in the certificate that it was genuine and valid and
gave them 100,000 shares of stock of the Clicquot
Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake City. Pre-eminent among that evidence is the evidence that they
paid for the stock.
Point VI

Scienter or Knowledge on the Part of One Making a material representation which is in fact false
is not necessary to liability for damages arising therefrom where there is a duty on the part of such person to know the facts and his lack of knowledge is
due to a neglect of that duty.
See Ashby vs. Peters, supra.
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In 73 A.L.R. at page 1120 is an annotation entitled "Fraud: Necessity for knowledge of falsity of
representation as to value, inducing subscription to
or purchase of corporate stock, or other securities."
Among the propositions set forth in that annotation
is the following at page 1130:
"There is a difference of opinion, in the
cases within the scope of the annotation, as to
the necessity for an actual fraudulent intent in
making the misrepresentation, and the effect
of the existence, or absence, of reasonable
grounds for belief in the truth thereof."
At page 1131, the rule supported by the majority
is stated:
"In this country, while more than mere
negligence is essential to support a charge of
fraud which induces the purchase of corporate
stock or other securities, an actual fraudulent
intent in making representations of matters
as of which one is ignorant is not, according to
the weight of authority, essential."
The reason for this mle is:

"* * * * * the doctrine of fraud is a
constmctive one merely, and the party's conduct, rather than his actual intent, controls, or,
to state the matter differently, the party making the misrepresentations will not, under
some circumstances, be heard to say that he
had no intent to deceive and therefore cannot
be held liable for fraud."
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These rules illustrate that it is not necessary for
the plaintiffs to have proved an actual fraudulent
state of mind on the part of the defendants to prove
a cause of action in the instant case.
In this case there was a duty on both Horne and
Sorense:p. to know whether there was stock available
for issue when they issued the Kartchner certificate.
Neither of them investigated to see whether such
stock was available, and it wasn't.

To allow these defendants to escape liability on
the ground that they did not actually know there was
no stock available for issue to the Kartchners would
be setting a most dangerous precedent. The court
would be saying to Presidents and Directors of corporations that they are free to issue void stock so long
as they are so ignorant of the affairs of their corporations (and, in the case of Horne, the effect of his resignation) that they do not know the stock to be invalid.
Such a rule would put a premium on careless
conduct and ignorance, and would reward those corporate officers who paid the least attention to the
duties imposed on them by statue and by their voluntary acceptance of corporate office and responsibility.
A corporate officer who paid no attention whatever
to the affairs of corporation would then be free of
liability for his misrepresentations.
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Point VII

Qne who represents a thing to be true without
knowing it to be true, is liable in deceit if it is in fact
false.
The Federal Supreme Court has held that a statement ·which is recklessly made, without knowledge of
its truth, and which is in reality false, is a false statement knowingly made, within the well-settled rule
respecting fraud. Cooper vs. Schlesinger, 111 U. S.
148, 28 L. ed. 382, 4 S. Ct. 360. This rule is so well
known and universally accepted as to make citation
of further authority superfluous.
The defendants Horne and Sorenson are liable
for deceit even if they did not know the Kartchner
certificate was void because they have represented
it to be a valid certificate without knowing it to be
valid. In view of the knowledge they had at the time
they issued the Kartchner certificate, the representations of the defendants were necessarily reckless.
Point VIII

Neither ratification nor estoppel can render the
Kartchner certificate valid or give the plaintiffs any
rights under it.
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This proposition is well set out in the case of
Pruitt vs. Oklahoma Steam Baking Co., supra:
"It is said that ratification in its correct
sense is impossible equally of an illegal and a
void contract. Moog v. Hannon's Adm'r., 93
Ala. 503, sub nom., Moog v. Espalla, 9 South.
596; Lindt v. Uihlein, 109 Iowa, 591, 79 N.W.
73; Id., 80 N.W. 658; Bick v. Seal, 45 Mo. App.
475; McCormick Harvesting Co. v. Miller, 54
Neb. 644, 74 N.W. 1061; Rue v. Missouri Pac.
Ry. Co., 74 Tex. 474, 8 S.W. 533, 15 Am. St.
Rep. 852; Page on Contracts, Sec. 511.

"When a corporation is acting within the
general scope of the powers conferred upon it
by the Legislature, the corporation, as well as
persons contracting with it, may be estopped
to deny that it has complied with the legal formalities which are prerequisites to its existence,
or to its action, because such requisites might
in fact have been complied with. But when a
contract is beyond the powers conferred upon
it by existing laws, neither the corporation nor
the other party to the contract can be estopped,
by assenting to it or by acting upon it, to say
that it was prohibited by those laws. Neither
can the contract be ratified by either party,
because it could not have been authorized by
either. No performance on either side can give
the unlawful contract any validity or be the
foundation of any right of action based upon it.
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 11 Sup. Ct. 478, 35 L.
Ed. 55."

* * * * *
"A very similar question was before the
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Supreme Court of Massachusetts in .lnzerican
Tube Works v. Boston Machine Co., 139 Mass.
5, 29 N .E. 63, involving the unauthorized issue
of a form of stock known as special stock. The
court, speaking through Allen, C. L., said: 'The
issue of special stock being invalid and being
open to repudiation by the corporation itself
or by dissenting stockholders, the plaintiff had
an election to rescind the contract under which
the special stock ""as taken and to be restored
to its original position. Allen v. Herrick, 15
Gray, 274, 284. It was not bound by any estoppel. In all the cases which have come under
our observation where one has been held to be
deemed a stockholder by estoppel, there has
been a legal creation of the capital stock. Such
was the case in Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S.
418 (24 L. Ed. 437). But where the issue of the
shares is illegal, where no sufficient steps have
been taken to authorize the creation of the
capital stock, where a person has acted and
been treated as a stockholder in respect of
shares which the company had no power to
issue, and where the shares cannot legally
exist, the person taking them cannot, by estoppel or otherwise, become a member in respect
to them. Lindl. Partn. 134.' "
The case of Laredo Implement Co. vs. Stevenson,
66 Fed. 633, states the rule as follows:
"Where the corporation is absolutely
without power to issue the stock * * * no act
or consent of the stockholder may estop him
from denying the validity of the stock."
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CONCLUSION

Simply stated, the appellants' case is that the
Kartchner certificate is void as an overissue and not
genuine because signed by a president who had previously resigned, that the defendants Horne and Sorensen are the persons who issued the certificate as
valid, in violation of their fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, that their doing so constitutes fraud and deceit
as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
rely and did rely on the representations of the defendants that the certificate was valid and gave them
100,000 shares of stock, and were damaged thereby
in the amount of $18,046.53; and that Horne and
Sorensen, as well as the corporation, are liable to
them.
To arrive at those simple propositions has, because of the shortcomings of the findings and conclusions below, required much discussion of the facts,
been long and at times circuitous. We regret having
been unable to achieve a less lengthy presentation,
but felt that an exhaustive discussion of the facts was
a necessary prelude to the relatively simple propositions of law controlling the case.

Respectfully submitted,
WoRSLEY, VERL C.
D. TANNER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
SKEEN, THURMAN
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